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This dissertation characterizes the legality and incidence of short selling in a 
worldwide, multimarket framework. Home country short selling restrictions curtail home 
market stock borrowing by 45% and reduce short selling of the country’s ADRs by 68% 
due to regulatory reach. Also, the 2008 U.S. ban on short selling of financial firms 
reduced borrowing in foreign locations. These findings are robust to controls for option 
availability, enforcement, returns, firm-size, trading volume, dividends, ADR level, 
volatility, days-to-cover and industry sector. Further, investor conduct resulting from 
adherence to professional standards is a more powerful mechanism of regulatory reach 
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Short selling has long been a controversial trading strategy.  The academic 
evidence on the value of short selling is mixed and market regulators’ actions suggest a 
degree of ambivalence toward the practice.1  On the one hand, regulators often publicly 
espouse the benefits of short selling in terms of its importance to the efficient processing 
of information in asset markets.2  On the other hand, these same regulators typically react 
to periods of market turmoil by banning short selling, arguing that the practice 
exacerbates market volatility and, in the extreme, destabilizes markets.  The most recent 
financial crisis is no exception and many regulators resorted to either outright bans on 
short selling, or imposed trading restrictions in an effort to stem the falling market and 
reduce volatility. Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007), and Charoenrook and Daouk (2008), 
and Beber and Pagano (2012) all provide evidence on the cross-country and time-series 
variation in short selling regulations. 
                                                 
1 Most academic papers argue that short selling is an essential part of the price discovery 
mechanism (Nilsson, 2008; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2009; Kolasinski, Reed, and Thornock, 
2009) whereas others express concern about price manipulation (Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van 
Ness, 2008). Nonetheless, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find that the practice is pervasive and 
short selling volume is 24% of NYSE and 31% of NASDAQ trading volume. Edwards and 
Hanley, (2010) find that short selling begins right from the day when a stock is sold in the initial 
public offering. 
 
2 For example, the Financial Services Authority (2002, p. 4), the NASDAQ 
(http://www.nasdaq.com/quotes/short-interest.aspx), Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) Chairman Greg Medcraft 
(www.theaustralian.com.au/business/markets/securities-regulator-will-not-ban-short-selling-says-
greg-medcraft/story-e6frg916-1226113803879) and SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey 
(http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch022410klc-shortsales.htm) have all stated that short 






The complexity of this issue is further exacerbated by the fact that, while the 
motivation for the bans is often clear, it is entirely unclear whether or not the bans were 
in any way successful in achieving these goals.  The limited empirical research suggests 
that the bans did not reduce volatility (Bris, 2008; Boulton and Braga-Alves, 2010; Saffi 
and Sigurdsson, 2011) and may even have increased volatility (Boehmer, Jones, and 
Zhang, 2009; Charoenrook and Daouk, 2009).  Indeed, it is interesting to note that the 
outgoing SEC chairman, Christopher Cox, admitted that the 2008 short selling bans were 
the “biggest mistake” of his term (Paley and Hilzenrath, 2008).3  Other regulators do not 
appear to share this view, however, and short selling bans were again imposed in many 
countries in 2011.  
The purpose of our study is to provide further evidence on the effectiveness of 
short selling restrictions. However, unlike previous research, our paper is the first to 
investigate how home market restrictions affect short selling in a global multimarket 
setting.  Specifically, we examine the extent to which national regulators are able to 
effectively enforce short selling restrictions both within and outside their home markets.  
Our focus is on firms that are cross- listed in the form of an ADR, as they provide an 
ideal setting for testing our research questions.  
In our paper, two competing hypotheses are considered to explain the impact of 
short selling restrictions on foreign markets–regulatory arbitrage versus regulatory 
reach.  The regulatory arbitrage hypothesis suggests that when the home market 
                                                 
3 Further, SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey also has publicly expressed her view that 





introduces restrictions, short selling moves to foreign locations.4  In the current context, 
this suggests that regulatory arbitrage increases ADR short volume if traders opt to trade 
in unrestricted regimes, although the existence of taxes or fees on foreign transactions, 
capital controls, inconvertibility of currencies, and market segmentation does complicate 
the relationship (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999).  Empirical support for this hypothesis can 
be found in Blau, Van Ness, and Warr (2012), who construct a feasibility index of short 
selling based on subjective assessment of survey responses and find evidence of 
increased shorting in the United States of ADRs from countries that prohibit short selling 
in the domestic market. An important point of distinction between Blau, Van Ness, and 
Warr (2012) and our paper is that we have invested substantial effort in ensuring that our 
legality of short selling variable accurately reflects the status of short selling in each 
country over time.5  Moreover, our data sample is more comprehensive and covers 1,035 
ADRs from November 2007 to December 2010 compared to only 352 ADRs sampled 
over 2005 and 2006 in Blau, Van Ness, and Warr (2012). 
The regulatory reach hypothesis suggests that home country restrictions curtail 
short selling of cross-listed stocks in foreign markets.  In the current context, this 
                                                 
4 Rodrigo Buenaventura from the CNMV commented that one of the reasons short selling 
was banned in Spain during the crisis was to avoid attracting the pent-up short selling demand 
that could not be expressed in other Euro markets, which had bans in place (“Short Sales 
Restrictions–What Are They Good For?”, panel discussion at the IX Madrid Finance Workshop 
(Short Selling), IESE, Madrid, Nov. 4, 2010.) 
 
5 Our effort corrects some erroneous classifications adopted in the prior research. For 
example, we are claiming that short selling in Spanish ADRs is high because it is legal to short 
sell in Spain (regulatory reach). Blau, Van Ness, and Warr (2012) conclude that short selling in 
Spanish ADRs is high because it is not feasible to short sell in Spain (regulatory arbitrage). The 
position taken in prior research is incorrect because our stock borrowing data show that it is 
actually very feasible to short sell in Spain. This observation is true for several countries where 
we observe short selling related borrowing (which has a correlation of 0.9 with short interest 




suggests that foreign country trading restrictions decrease short selling of a stock’s ADR 
in the U.S. market. Regulatory reach can decrease short selling of a country’s ADRs in 
the United States through a variety of mechanisms that we group into two major themes–
inter-government cooperation and investor conduct.  Regulatory reach may reflect a 
country’s bilateral investment treaties or membership in groups such as G7, OECD or the 
EU, which facilitate inter-government cooperation through clearer communication of the 
regulatory intent to foreign market participants (Lau and McInish, 2002), the court’s 
recognition and enforcement of foreign laws (Keller, 2004), and cooperation among 
global law enforcement agencies (Block, 2007; Hamilton, 2008). For example, in 2008 
the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued Short Selling (No. 3) Instrument 
2008/51, which according to Avgouleas (2010, p.17), “had a global reach covering 
shorting of shares in the list anywhere, e.g., on Frankfurt (Deutsche Borse) or the New 
York Stock Exchange.” Similarly, in its statement concerning short selling, the SEC 
(2008-235) stated that its actions were taken in consultation with regulators of the major 
developed securities markets around the world with which it coordinated in monitoring 
market reactions. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has 
put in place a structure for its member agencies to cooperate and exchange information in 
the process of developing, implementing and promoting adherence to internationally 
recognized and consistent standards of regulation, oversight, and enforcement. 
Alternatively, regulatory reach may be driven by investor conduct and worldwide 
compliance. For example, financial firms may avoid circumventing regulations in their 
home markets to avoid scrutiny by the regulator and possibly violating the terms of their 




2002), and Erickson, Goolsbee, and Maydew (2003) observe that the overwhelming 
majority of firms take a conservative stance and do not engage in regulatory arbitrage at 
all. Further, many individuals employed within the finance industry are governed by the 
CFA Institute's Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct, which states that 
members must understand and comply with all applicable laws, rules, and regulations of 
any government, regulatory organization, licensing agency, or professional association 
governing their professional activities. In the event of conflict, members must comply 
with the more strict law, rule, or regulation. Similarly, the Institute’s standard relating to 
integrity of capital markets and market manipulation, may discourage members from 
undertaking stock lending and other closely related activities when short selling is 
unlawful. 
In our paper, we have assembled a unique panel database from a variety of 
sources, which allows us to establish the relative effectiveness of short selling 
restrictions, including the relative merits of the regulatory reach versus regulatory 
arbitrage hypotheses. The distinction between these two hypotheses is important because 
in a race to the bottom (Schram, 2000), regulatory arbitrage implies that stricter rules 
(whether excessive or fair) decrease a country's business competitiveness relative to other 
countries with lax rules. Therefore, regulatory reach is essential to obtain the desired 
investor protection outcomes with reasonable costs in a competitive global economy. 
The main results of our paper may be summarized as follows. We begin by 
considering the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement of short selling restrictions in the 
home markets.  While intuitively obvious, empirical work on this issue is lacking, and, as 




countries that impose restrictions. To understand the dynamics of a multi-market trading 
environment, we combine several unique short selling datasets containing stock 
borrowing, short interest, and short trading volume. Univariate comparisons, matched 
control sample experiments, multivariate regressions, all consistently provide evidence in 
support of the regulatory reach hypothesis. That is to say, restrictions curtail short selling 
not only in the home market, but also in the U.S. market where the ADRs are cross-listed. 
These findings remain strongly significant after controlling for option market availability, 
past returns, return volatility, firm specific characteristics such as size and dividend 
policy, ADR level, stock borrowing costs, industrial sectors, and trading volume. 
Furthermore, we find that regulatory reach also works for U.S. firms in the reverse 
direction. Specifically, in September 2008 when the United States banned short selling of 
financial firms, stock borrowing for those firms declined in the foreign locations outside 
the United States as well. Finally, we test the mechanisms of regulatory reach and find 






Data sources and sample formation 
Firms with cross-listed ADRs provide an ideal setting for testing our research 
questions.  As such, a list of 2,892 eligible firms and their International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN) was sourced in November 2009 from the Bank of New 
York Mellon and J.P. Morgan web sites.1 Each firm’s home country is identified using 
the first two digits of the ISIN, which represents the originating country’s ISO codes.  We 
sourced from Datastream information on firm-specific returns, market capitalization, 
volume, dividend yield, closing price, intraday high price, intraday low price, and sector 
classification information. 
For each of these ADR-issuing firms, data on short selling is assembled from a 
variety of sources. We obtain daily information on the stock lending industry from Data 
Explorers for the period July 2006 to January 2010.2  Data Explorers report that the 
correlation between publicly reported levels of short interest and the level of stock 
lending is approximately 0.90, which suggests that stock lending data provide a 
reasonable proxy for short selling.  In addition to individual stock loan information, Data 
Explorers also provides information on the amount of stock available for loan and the 
stock borrowing cost. It is important to note that the database allows the identification of 
                                                 
1 The cumulative sponsor bank list from J.P. Morgan and Bank of New York Mellon 
contains 3,013 ADRs. We removed the firms, which are listed or exchanged outside the United 
States, and firms that do not have information on ISIN. 
 
2 Data Explorers data are available on Bloomberg. Data Explorers is based in London and 
according to its website its institutional clients account for 70% of the worldwide stock borrowing 
related to short selling. Data Explorers covers thousands of equities worldwide and receives 
information on more than 3 million transactions daily from more than 100 top securities lending 





the country where the borrowing takes place, so that it is possible to tell whether the 
shares are being borrowed in the home country or elsewhere.  A more detailed 
description of the Data Explorers dataset may be found in Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011).3 
After merging the initial sample with Data Explorers stock borrowing data and 
Datastream firm characteristics data, our final daily data sample has 1,601 ADRs to 
assess regulatory effectiveness.  
In addition to the daily Data Explorers stock borrowing information, we also 
source fortnightly short interest data from Shortsqueeze.com for more than 16,000 stocks 
that trade on NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX, OTC/BB, and Pink Sheets. Short interest is 
defined as the total number of outstanding shorted shares for each security. In addition to 
the number of shares sold short, supporting data such as days to cover and institutional 
ownership also are available. Triangulation of the initial ADR list, the shortsqueeze.com 
open interest data and Datastream, yields a fortnightly data sample of 1,035 ADRs. 
Our final sources of short selling data are FINRA (Regulation-SHO data) and the 
BATS exchange. These transaction level short sale data are aggregated to obtain daily 
short volume for each stock from the first availability date of August 2009 to January 
2010 (the latest period for which we have Data Explorers data). Triangulation of the 
initial ADR list, the aggregated daily FINRA and BATS data and Datastream yields a 
trading data sample of 559 ADRs.  
                                                 
3 We clean the Data Explorers data in several ways. We eliminate exact duplicates. Data 
Explorers provides values in one of four currencies—USD, EUR, JPY, AUD—depending on 
where the data are collected. We convert all monetary values into USD based on daily exchange 
rates obtained from Datastream. Data Explorers includes the variable dividend requirement that 
allows us to make sure that our results are not affected by dividend capture trades. We keep the 
observations with dividend requirement = 100, because these are the standard loan agreements. 






Short selling regulations around the world 
Information on the legality of short selling across a wide range of countries is 
obtained by cross-referencing the survey articles of Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007), 
Charoenrook and Daouk (2008), and Beber and Pagano (2012) with the practitioner’s 
report of Clifford Chance LLP (2009). Where clarification or further information is 
necessary, we directly correspond with the stock exchanges and financial market 
regulators. Table 1 presents a summary of information on the legality status of short 
selling in each country with specific details of the periods when short selling was legal or 
illegal.  In addition to considering a simple binomial measure of short selling legality, we 
attempt to gain additional insights into the impact of short selling restrictions by 
distinguishing between the different short selling rules that exist.  The details of any 
intermediate forms of restrictions also are presented in columns 2 to 4. Apart from 
outright bans, other forms of restrictions include specific trading mechanisms (up-tick 
rule), pre-borrowing requirements (ban on naked short selling), and bans on shorting 
selected stocks (typically financial stocks). 
Similar to previous studies, we create an indicator variable, illegal, which equals 
1 if short selling is prohibited in the home market and 0 otherwise. Unlike the past 
research however, which typically specifies an unconditional measure of short selling 
restrictions, we allow this variable to vary over time for countries that changed their short 
selling rules during the sample period. For example, 19 countries imposed temporary 




restriction on short selling for 11 brokerage firms in 2008. The intermediate forms of 
restrictions create interesting cross-sectional variations for our analysis. 
Table 1 also presents basic metrics on the relative presence of short selling in each 
country. The average short interest ratio for all ADRs from each country, which is 
defined as short interest as a percentage of shares float, is reported in column 5. The 
aggregate dollar amount of short-selling related borrowing of all stocks from each 
country is reported in column 6. Finally, column 7 presents the aggregate scaled 
borrowing ratio (SBR) for each country, which is calculated as the daily average 
outstanding dollar borrowing divided by the country’s total stock market capitalization at 
the end of previous year.  These last two statistics are derived using Data Explorers data, 
where the daily data is averaged across all days in the sample period.  
Preliminary insights into the impact of regulations on short selling may be 
obtained by considering a plot of short selling in home markets as well as in the ADR 
markets. Sample firms are divided in two groups of unrestricted versus restricted based 
on home-country short-selling regulatory regimes. The restricted category includes uptick 
restriction, naked ban, or a total ban on short selling. In Figure 1a, we plot the average 
home market stock borrowing in millions of USD for the countries in the two groups. In 
Figure 1b, stock borrowing is scaled by the firm’s market capitalization. Both panels 
indicate that short selling restrictions are effective in curtailing home market stock 
borrowing because the stock borrowing for unrestricted countries is higher than the stock 





Global shifts in short selling regulations and activity 
We provide a timeline of the legality of short selling around the world, including the dates of bans implemented during the 
financial crisis of 2008. We also provide details both of borrowing in the home country and short selling of ADRs in the 
United States. We report the periods when short selling was legal (column 2) or illegal (column 3) in a particular country. For 
these two columns, we classify the period as illegal based on a total ban. None, always, and since inception in these two 
columns refer to periods within our sample period. In column 4, we report other short-selling restrictions when short selling is 
not completely banned. In column 5, we report the ADR short interest ratio which is defined as the short interest as a 
percentage of share float. In column 6, we report the daily average outstanding dollar value of shares borrowed summed across 
all stocks from that country. In column 7, we present the scaled borrowing ratio (SBR), which is the daily average outstanding 
dollar borrowing during our sample period (July 2006 to January 2010) divided by the country’s total stock market 
capitalization at the end of the previous year. 













Argentina Since 1999 Before 1999 Up-tick rule applies; Naked 
short selling prohibited 
0.86 0 0.00 





Naked short selling prohibited 
since 2001 
Ban on shorting financial 
stock: 9/22/2008 - 05/25/2009 
0.35 30,258 3.04 
Austria Since inception None Ban on naked short selling of 
financial stocks: 10/27/2008 - 
11/30/2010 
0.00 3,777 2.43 
Bahrain None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Bangladesh b None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Barbados None Always  No ADRs 0 0.00 
Belgium Since inception None Ban on naked short selling of 
financial stocks: 9/22/2008 - 
9/21/2009 
0.52 6,720 2.17 
Bermuda None Always  0.00 8,985 NA 




Table 1–continued      













Bulgaria None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Canada c Since inception None; see 
comments 
Ban on shorting financial 
stocks (including inter-listed 
in U.S.): 9/19/2008 - 
10/08/2008; Up-tick rule 
applies 
No ADRs 58,183 3.63 
Cayman 
Islands 
Since inception None Very little trading occurs on 
the stock exchange 
6.71 4,395 NA 
Chile Since 1999 Before 1999 Up-tick rule applies; Naked 
short selling prohibited 
0.36 0 0.00 
China None Always; see 
comments 
In 9/2008, China allowed 
short selling of 11 brokerage 
firms on a pilot basis 
0.87 9,440 0.28 
Colombia None Always  0.74 0 0.00 
Croatia None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Cyprus None Always  0.00 173 1.09 
Czech 
Republic 
Since inception None  0.00 104 0.19 
Denmark Since inception None; see 
comments 
Ban on shorting bank stocks: 
10/13/2008–Present 
0.13 3,650 1.76 
Ecuador b None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Egypt a None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Finland Since 1998 Before 1998  0.55 6,423 2.55 
France Since inception None; see 
comments 
Ban on naked short selling of 
credit institutions and 
insurance companies' stocks: 
9/22/2008 - Present 
2.63 102,719 4.77 
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Germany Since inception None; see 
comments 
Investment funds except 
hedge funds may not short 
sell; Ban on naked short 
selling of specified financial 
stocks: 9/19/2008–Present 
0.53 81,259 5.24 





Up-tick rule applies; Naked 
short selling prohibited 
0.08 177 0.10 
Hong Kong a Since 1994 Before 1994 Permitted for specified 
securities (33 in 1994-95); 
Up-tick rule applies; Naked 
short selling prohibited 
6.29 7,561 0.00 
Hungary Since 1996 Before 1996  0.05 905 2.57 
Iceland Since inception None; see 
comments 
Ban on naked short selling of 
financial stocks: 11/06/2008 
- 1/31/2009 







Badla trading means carry 
over transaction with 
extended rolling settlements; 
Naked short selling is 
prohibited; On 10/20/2008, 
SEBI disapproved stock 
lending by FIIs of 
participatory notes (PNs) 
stocks  
1.26 1 0.00 
Indonesia Pre Oct 2008; 
May 2009–
Present 
Oct. 2008 - April 
2009 
Legal only for specified 
stocks 
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Ireland Since inception None; see 
comments 
Ban on naked short selling of 
financial stocks: 9/19/2008–
Present 
0.97 2,349 2.03 
Israel Since inception None Naked short selling 
prohibited 
1.09 293 0.17 
Italy Since inception None Naked short selling ban for 
financial stocks: 9/22/2008 - 
5/31/2009; Naked short 
selling ban for non-financial 
stocks: 10/10/2008 - 
1/01/2009 
1.66 29,328 3.45 
Jamaica None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Japan Since inception None Up-tick rule and locate 
requirement apply; Ban on 
naked short selling: 
10/30/2008–Present 
0.30 47,580 1.13 
Jordan None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Kazakhstan b None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Kuwait None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Latvia None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Lebanon b None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Lithuania None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Luxembourg Since inception None Ban on naked short selling of 
banks and insurance 
companies: 9/19/2008–
Present 
3.19 5,100 5.29 
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Malaysia Pre-1997; Jan. 
2007–Present 
Sep. 1997 to 
Dec. 2006 
Naked short selling 
prohibited; Uptick rule 
applies; Legal only for 
specified stocks 
0.00 5 0.00 
Malta b None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Mauritius None Always  0.00 23 0.57 
Mexico Since inception None Naked short selling 
prohibited; Up-tick rule 
applies 
1.33 1,043 0.33 
Morocco None Always  0.00 35 0.06 
Netherlands Since inception None Naked short selling ban: 
9/22/2008 - 6/01/2009 
0.92 18,453 2.69 
New Zealand Since 1992 Before 1992 Since April 1992, specified 
securities eligible for short 
selling; After July 2000, all 
liquid securities eligible. 
Short selling is hindered by 
tax legislation. 
0.09 760 1.91 
Nigeria None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Norway Since 1992 None; see 
comments 
Ban on naked short selling 
of 5 specified financial 
stocks: 10/08/2008 - Present 
0.32 5,803 2.38 
Oman b None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
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Pakistan Since inception None “Regulations for Short 
Selling under Ready 
Market” introduced in 2002: 
Naked short selling is 
prohibited; Up-tick rule 
applies; Short selling 
allowed only in prescribed 
securities 
0.00 0 0.00 
Panama None Always  0.00 959 15.84 
Peru None Always  0.96 0 0.00 
Philippines Since 1998 Before 1998 Naked short selling 
prohibited; Up-tick rule 
applies; Legal only for 
specified stocks 
0.31 6 0.01 
Poland Since 2000 Before 2000 Shorting allowed only in the 
permitted securities 
0.00 41 0.03 
Portugal Since inception None Ban on naked short selling 
of specified financial stocks: 
9/24/2008 - Present 
0.03 1,384 1.43 
Qatar b Since inception None  0.00 0 0.00 






Up-tick rule applies 1.47 73 0.00 
Serbia None Always  No ADRs 0 0.00 
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Singapore Since inception None Ban on naked short sales in 
buy-in market. Onshore 
lending is limited while 
offshore lending is active 
0.07 3,359 1.22 
Slovakia a None Always  No ADRs 0 0.00 
Slovenia Since inception None  No ADRs 0 0.00 
South Africa Since inception None Naked short selling 
prohibited 
1.02 2,259 0.34 







Ban on shorting financial 
stocks: 10/1/2008–Present; 
Naked short selling ban from 
June 2000 to Present; Up-
tick rule applies 
0.76 3,633 0.00 
Spain Since 1992 Before 1992 Naked short selling 
prohibited 
0.09 30,330 2.34 
Sri Lanka None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Sweden Since 1991 Before 1991  1.39 11,065 2.37 
Switzerland Since inception None; see 
comments 
9/19/2008 - 1/16/2009: 
Swiss Federal Banking 
Commission and SIX Swiss 
Exchange prohibited naked 
short selling; SWX-Europe 
also prohibited creation or 
increase of a net short 
position in certain specified 
UK and Swiss financial 
stocks 
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Up-tick rule applies 0.76 301 0.00 
Thailand Since Jan 2001 Before Jan 2001 Only specified securities are 
eligible (underlying 
securities of SET 50 index, 
ETF, and underlying 
securities of ETF); Up-tick 
rule applies; Naked short 
selling prohibited 
0.00 390 0.27 
Tunisia b None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
Turkey Since inception None Up-tick rule applies; Only 
specified stocks eligible 
0.38 481 0.26 
Ukraine None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
UAE None Always  0.00 9 0.01 
United 
Kingdom 
Since inception None; see 
comments 
Ban on short selling of 
specified financial stocks: 
9/19/2008 - 1/16/2009 
0.55 73,044 2.33 
United States c Since inception None; see 
comments 
Up-tick rule effective: 
2/01/1938 - 7/03/2007; Ban 
on naked short selling of 19 
financial stocks: 7/21/2008 - 
8/12/2008; Ban on short 
selling of specified financial 
stocks: 9/19/2008 - 
10/08/2008; Quote based 
restrictions imposed in 2010. 
No ADRs 510,764 3.01 




Table 1–continued      













Venezuela None Always  0.00 3 0.00 
Zambia None Always  No ADRs 0 0.00 
Zimbabwe None Always  0.00 0 0.00 
a This country has some borrowing in the Data Explorers data, but we do not have market capitalization for this country. 
b This country is not included in Data Explorers. 
c The United States does not have any ADRs for domestic companies. Canadian stocks also are fully fungible and do not trade 
as ADRs. Hence, the United States and Canada are excluded from the remainder of our analysis. 
Next, we use the short interest and short volume data to provide a macro level assessment of the regulatory reach 
versus regulatory arbitrage hypothesis.  In Figure 2a, we plot the short interest of ADRs originating from the countries where 
short selling is legal and from the countries where short selling is illegal. The short interest of ADRs from the countries where 
short selling is legal is generally higher (41 out of 48 fortnights), than the short interest of ADRs from the countries where it is 
illegal. 
Figure 2b presents a similar plot for short volume and shows that short volume of ADRs from the countries where short 
selling is legal is always higher than the short volume of ADRs from the countries where it is illegal. Thus, these results 









Short selling in the home country, by short selling regime 
In Figure 1a, We plot short selling related borrowing (amount outstanding at the end of 
each day, in millions of USD) for the countries where short selling is restricted (solid 
line) and for the countries where short selling is unrestricted (broken line). Short 
borrowing data are from Data Explorers for July 2006 to January 2010. Each observation 
in the original dataset represents dollar stock borrowing for a given stock on a given day. 
Based on the originating country’s short selling restriction on the relevant calendar day, 
each stock-day is allocated to either the restricted or the unrestricted portfolio. Then, for 
each country we compute the average stock borrowing across all stocks from that country 
and then the average across countries. In Figure 1b, we scale the dollar borrowing by the 











Impact of home country regulations on monthly short selling of ADRs in the United 
States 
In Figure 2a, we plot the short interest of ADRs from countries where short selling is 
illegal (solid line) and from countries where short selling is legal (broken line). Short 
interest data are from shortsqueezee.com for November 2007 to October 2009. In Figure 
2b, we plot the short volume of ADRs from the countries where short selling is illegal 
(solid line) and legal (broken line). Short volume data are from the FINRA and BATS 
exchanges for August 2009 to January 2010. Short interest data are at fortnightly 
frequency and short volume is at daily frequency. We follow a two-step averaging 
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We begin with a brief description of our general framework for the regression 
models and then present specific regression equations assessing home market 
effectiveness of short selling restrictions and pair-wise tests of worldwide regulatory 
reach. The Appendix shows our data source and variable definition for each of our 
variables. 
 
4.1. Regulatory restrictions and other determinants of short selling 
 Our main dependent variable is short selling, which we measure with three 
alternative variables–stock borrowing in the home market, short interest of ADRs in the 
United States, and short volume of ADRs in the United States. Our key explanatory 
variable relates to the regulatory environment and captures information on whether short 
selling is legal or illegal and restricted or unrestricted.  
The prior research suggests the need to include several control variables, although 
the nature of their relationship with short selling is often unclear and few papers offer any 
direct test of how those variables affect short selling in a multi-market context. The 
presence of options trading is one such variable. Figlewski and Webb (1993) find a 
significantly higher average level of short interest for optionable stocks and argue that 
options facilitate short selling, which suggests a complementary effect. Similarly, 
Battalio and Schultz (2011) document complementarities between short selling and 
options. On the other hand, Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) propose that options reduce 




and Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) as well as Jain, Jain, and McInish (2012) find that 
positive stock returns increase short selling. Blau, Van Ness, Van Ness, and Wood (2010) 
however, find that extremely negative market returns increase short selling. Diether, Lee, 
and Werner (2009) also show that return volatility affects short selling. Jones and Lamont 
(2002) find that stocks that are expensive to short or that enter the borrowing market have 
high valuations and low subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis. 
D’Avolio (2002) documents significant variations in borrowing costs across stocks, with 
a few stocks that become extremely special, demanding negative rebate rates (i.e., loan 
fees in excess of the risk-free rate). Krispy Kreme Doughnuts and Palm Inc. are examples 
of such stocks, exhibiting loan fees as high as 50% and 35%, respectively. To summarize, 
the evidence presented in these studies suggest that our model needs to include control 
variables for the existence of an option market in the home country, past returns, return 
volatility, and stock borrowing costs. We also include a number of other control variables 
that may relate to the level of short selling such as dividend yield, firm size (Diether, Lee 
and Werner, 2009), the level of the ADRs, and days to cover. 
Note that D’Avolio (2002) and Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) argue that 
higher institutional ownership positively affects short selling by increasing the supply of 
loanable shares. Due to the limited availability of such data however, we use institutional 
ownership data only in a robustness test and we expect a positive relationship between 





4.2. Regulatory effectiveness of short selling restriction in curtailing home market stock 
borrowing  
We assess the home market effectiveness of short selling restrictions using daily 
Data Explorers data for short selling related borrowing. If the regulations are effectively 
enforced, countries with restrictions will have a lower amount of borrowing. Thus, we 
expect a statistically significant negative coefficient for the illegal variable in the 
regression with stock borrowing as a dependent variable. We estimate all or a subset of  
the following equation and report the results in Table 2: 
scaled shares borrowed in home countryi,d = α0 + α1 illegalc,d  
+ α2 uptick restrictionc,d + α3 option marketsc,yr + α4 returni,d + α5 weekly returni,d-1 
+ α6 monthly returni,d-1 + α7 half-yearly returni,d-1 + α8 scaled volumei,d  
+ α9 dividend yieldi,d + α10 return volatilityi,d + α11borrowing costi,d  
+ α12-15 industrial sector fixed effectsi + εi,d                                                    (1) 
where α0–α15 are parameters to be estimated and ε is a random error term. Subscripts i, d, 
c, and yr denote firm, day, country, and year, respectively. The subscript d -1 indicates 
that the return period ends on the day before day d. The dependent variable is scaled 
shares borrowed, which is the home market borrowing of each individual firm on day t, 











Regulatory effectiveness of home country short selling restrictions in curtailing home 
market stock borrowing 
For this table, our sample comprises the underlying stocks for 1,601 ADRs for the 
period from July 2006 to January 2010. All our variables are defined in the Appendix. 
For each stock i for each day d, we collect the home market dollar stock borrowing, 
which we divide by stock i‘s market capitalization to produce our dependent variable, the 
firm’s scaled shares borrowed in the home country. Our main independent variables are 
the dummy variables illegal and uptick restriction. The remaining independent variables 
are: option markets, return, weekly return, monthly return, half yearly return, scaled 
volume, dividend yield, return volatility, borrowing cost, and sector fixed effects. 
Subscripts i, d, c, and yr denote firm, day, country, and year, respectively. All coefficients 
are standardized using the SAS proc reg stb option. Continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Statistical significance is based on double clustered 
standard errors along the firm and fortnightly time dimensions following Petersen (2009). 
                              Dependent variable: Scaled shares borrowed in home countryi,d 
Variable                              Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c 
Intercept 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Illegalc,d -0.0063***  -0.0017* 
 (-4.95)  (-1.69) 
Uptick restrictionc,d  -0.0471*** -0.0469*** 
  (-5.22) (-5.20) 
Option marketsc,yr 0.0321*** 0.0156*** 0.0156*** 
 (7.15) (3.27) (3.29) 
Returni,d -0.0067 -0.0069 -0.0069 
 (-1.38) (-1.42) (-1.42) 
Weekly returni,d-1 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0011 
 (-0.94) (-0.90) (-0.89) 
Monthly returni,d-1 -0.0089 -0.0088 -0.0088 
 (-1.23) (-1.21) (-1.22) 
Half yearly returni,d-1 0.0110* 0.0069 0.0067 
 (1.78) (1.20) (1.16) 
Scaled volumei,d 0.4589 0.4578 0.4578 
 (1.32) (1.31) (1.31) 
Dividend Yieldi,d -0.0031 -0.0132** -0.0130** 
 (-0.58) (-2.32) (-2.30) 
Return volatilityi,d -0.0031*** -0.0019** -0.0019** 
 (-3.39) (-2.46) (-2.48) 
Borrowing costi,d 0.0168 0.0138 0.0139 
 (1.38) (1.19) (1.20) 
Days to coveri,d-1 0.0114*** 0.0095*** 0.0095*** 
 (4.41) (4.35) (4.35) 
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    Adjusted R Square 0.2128 0.2146 0.2146 
Number of Observations 928,330 928,330 928,330 




Hereafter, we present standardized coefficient estimates to allow comparison of 
the relative impact and importance of each determinant of short selling.1 Furthermore, we 
report statistical significance based on double clustered standard errors along firm and 
fortnightly time dimensions following Petersen (2009). 
We find that the coefficient of illegal is negative and significant in both models 1a 
and 1c presented in Table 2. Similarly, the coefficient of the uptick restriction also is 
negative and significant in models 1b and 1c, indicating that short selling restrictions are 
associated with a lower level of stock borrowing in the home country. These results point 
to the regulatory effectiveness of short selling restrictions in curtailing borrowing activity 
in the home country.  
Among the control variables, the coefficient on option markets is positive and 
significant in all models, indicating that derivative trades have the complementary effect 
of increasing stock borrowing in the home market. The coefficients of the return variables 
are not significant in any of the three models except for the half yearly return in model 
1a. The insignificant coefficient of scaled volume indicates the lack of a strong 
relationship between total volume and scaled stock borrowing, but we note that our raw 
data suggest that the unscaled dollar borrowing is proportional to the stock’s trading 
volume. Stock borrowing is lower for dividend payers and for volatile stocks. The 
coefficient of borrowing cost is not significant.  The positive and significant coefficient 
of days to cover indicates that borrowers are not deterred by the length of time that it 
might take to cover the aggregate borrowed positions. Instead, our findings suggest that 
                                                 
1 We obtain these coefficients using the reg stb function of SAS. These coefficients are 
estimates when all variables in the model are standardized to zero mean and unit variance prior to 
performing the regression computations. Thus, the standardized intercept is 0.0000. The t-




traders may apply momentum strategies and borrow previously borrowed stocks even 
more. Sector dummies for utilities, transportation, insurance, financial firms, and the 
suppressed base case of industrials are included to capture industry fixed effects.  
 
4.3. Impact of new restrictions on short selling in the home country and on ADRs  
In this section we test the regulatory reach hypothesis. We begin with univariate 
comparisons of differences in short-selling related borrowing in underlying markets and 
ADR markets during the most and least restrictive regimes, in turn. 
Table 3 presents a pair-wise comparison of the least restrictive and the most 
restrictive short selling regimes for the 18 countries that changed their regulations during 
our sample period.2 The different regulatory regimes in the order of increasing 
restrictiveness are no ban, uptick rule or naked ban, uptick and naked ban, and total ban 
on any type of short selling. Although regulatory effectiveness is not the main focus of 
our paper, our panel-data analysis of this issue is more comprehensive than previous 
work as prior studies either focused on a single country over time or a cross section of 
data across multiple countries.  
We observe that short-selling-related stock borrowing scaled by market 
capitalization is much higher in less restrictive regimes than in more restrictive regimes. 
This statement applies not only to the borrowing in underlying markets, but also extends 
to ADRs, consistent with our regulatory reach hypothesis. There is no evidence that 
traders try to move their activity internationally to avoid domestic restrictions. For 
                                                 
2 Short selling restrictions changed for China and Malaysia during our sample period; 
however, since we do not have stock borrowing data during different regulatory regimes for a 





example, when Australia restricted short selling, the ratio of shares borrowed to market 
capitalization dropped from 2.97% to 1.55%, representing a 48% decline. More 
importantly, the scaled short borrowing in Australian ADRs also declined from 0.070% 
to 0.035%, representing a 50% decline. The averages for the 18 countries in this table 
support the regulatory reach hypothesis as well. When short selling is restricted, the short 
borrowing ratio declines by an average of 45% in the home markets and 68% in the ADR 
market. Both changes are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In Panel A, we have 
used underlying stock’s market capitalization to scale the stock borrowing of both the 
ADRs and the underlying stock. Using this metric, the effects of regulations are larger in 
magnitude for home markets than for ADRs. Alternatively, because ADR volume is 
smaller than the volume in home markets, we also test the differences in stock borrowing 
scaled by ADR daily volume in Panel B.3 Average stock borrowing drops from 6.64 
times of daily volume in least restrictive regimes to 3.86 times of daily volume in the 
most restrictive regimes, which represents a 42% decline.   
We also decompose the percentage decline in the stock borrowing in underlying 
and ADR markets into the 5 types of regulatory changes adopted by the countries listed 
in table 3. For the first type of regulatory change, where countries shift from no ban to a 
ban on naked shorts (Free-N), stock borrowing declines by 49% in the underlying market 
and 80% in the ADR market. For the second type of restriction, where countries shift 
from a ban on naked shorts to a complete or total ban on any type of short selling (N-TB), 
stock borrowing declines by 48% in the underlying market and 50% in the ADR market.
                                                 
3 Datastream, CRSP, shortsqueeze.com, JP Morgan, and BNY Mellon do not report the 
ADR float. Since ADR volume is highly correlated with ADR float however, we are able to 
proxy float data using volume data for ADRs and underlying stocks that are readily available 




Impact of home market short selling restrictions on stock borrowing in home country and ADR borrowing in the United States 
Our sample for this table comprises 1,695 underlying stocks and 853 ADRs from 18 countries that changed their short selling 
rules during July 2006 to January 2010. The acronym for restrictions (from the least restrictive to the most restrictive) in the 
nature of change column are as follows: no ban (Free), naked ban (N), uptick restriction (UR), naked ban plus uptick (N&UR), 
and total ban on any type of short selling (TB). We average the stock borrowings for all firms in a given country for each day d 
from Data Explorer during the less (more) restrictions in column 1 (2) for underlying shares and column 5 (6) for ADRs. In 
column 4 (8), we present the values in column 3 (7) converted to percentages differences. For Panel A, we scale borrowing of 
both ADRs and underlying stock by market capitalization of the underlying stock. For Panel B we scale borrowing of 
underlying stock by daily trading volume of the underlying stock and borrowing of ADR by daily trading volume of ADR. 
Volume based scaled borrowing is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In the last row of each Panel, we report the t-
statistic for a paired difference test.  
 
 Panel A: Scaled borrowing = $ shares borrowed / Market capitalization 
  Underlying in home country ADRs Anywhere 
























Australia N-TB 2.979% 1.551% -1.427% -48% 0.070% 0.035% -0.035% -50% 
Austria Free-N 3.131% 1.521% -1.610% -51% 0.004% 0.001% -0.003% -70% 
Belgium Free-N 1.926% 0.716% -1.210% -63% 0.030% 0.000% -0.030% -100% 
Denmark Free-
TB 
2.607% 0.331% -2.277% -87% 0.057% 0.002% -0.056% -97% 
France Free-N 5.152% 4.494% -0.658% -13% 0.093% 0.005% -0.088% -95% 
Germany Free-N 4.981% 2.794% -2.187% -44% 0.070% 0.002% -0.068% -97% 
Greece N&UR 
- TB 
0.103% 0.072% -0.031% -30% 0.038% 0.007% -0.031% -80% 
Indonesia Free-
TB 
0.043% 0.005% -0.038% -89% 0.252% 0.193% -0.059% -24% 
Ireland Free-N 0.665% 0.079% -0.586% -88% 1.139% 0.018% -1.120% -98% 
Italy Free-N 3.300% 1.389% -1.910% -58% 0.031% 0.033% 0.002% 8% 
Japan UR - 
N&UR 




Table 3–continued  
  Underlying in home country ADRs Anywhere 
























Netherlands Free-N 3.839% 2.560% -1.279% -33% 0.277% 0.070% -0.208% -75% 
Norway Free-N 3.361% 1.648% -1.713% -51% 0.028% 0.000% -0.028% -100% 





0.510% 0.203% -0.307% -60% 0.386% 0.252% -0.134% -35% 
Switzerland Free-N 3.578% 2.535% -1.044% -29% 0.108% 0.029% -0.079% -73% 
Taiwan N&UR 
- TB 





2.604% 1.694% -0.910% -35% 0.129% 0.080% -0.049% -38% 
Weighted 
Average 
 2.315% 1.277% -1.039%*** -45%*** 0.173% 0.055% -0.118%** -68%*** 
t values    (-6.15) (-10.43)   (-1.97) (-8.70) 
 Panel B. Scaled borrowing = Dollar value of shares borrowed / Firm’s daily trading volume 
Weighted 
Average 
 42.65 15.01 -27.64 -65%*** 6.64 3.85 -2.79*** -42%*** 
t values    (-1.09) (-3.19)   (-3.40) (-3.24) 
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level 
For the third type of restriction, where countries shift from no ban to a complete ban (Free-TB), stock borrowing 
declines by 70% in the underlying market and 53% in the ADR market. For the fourth type of restriction, where countries shift 
from naked & uptick restriction to a complete ban (N&UR-TB), stock borrowing declines by 53% in the underlying market 
and 48% in the ADR market.
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Finally, when countries shift from uptick restriction to a naked & uptick 
restriction (UR-N&UR), stock borrowing declines by 42% in the underlying market and 
57% in the ADR market. Each of the five types of increases in the regulatory restrictions 
reduces short selling in both the underlying market and the ADR market simultaneously, 
consistent with the regulatory reach hypothesis. 
4.4. Multivariate analysis of regulatory reach 
In this section, we test the regulatory reach hypothesis in a multivariate setting by 
adding several firm-specific fundamentals or country characteristics. Both short interest 
and short volume data are analyzed. First, we estimate regressions based on all or a 
subset of the following equation using fortnightly short interest data from  
shortsqueeze.com: 
scaled ADR short interesti,ft = α0 + α1 illegalc,ft + α2 uptick restrictionc,ft  
+ α3 option marketsc,yr + α4 enforcement indexc  
+ α5 restrictionsc,ft * enforcement indexc + α6 fortnightly returni,ft-1  
+  α7 monthly returni,ft + α8 half-yearly returni,ft  
+ α9 orthogonalized market capitalizationi + α10 scaled volumei,ft  
+ α11 dividend yieldi,ft  + α12 level of ADRi + α13 return volatilityi,ft  
+ α14 days to coveri,ft  + α15-18 industrial sector fixed effectsi + εi,ft                       (2) 
where α0–α18 are parameters to be estimated and ε is a random error term. Subscripts i, ft, 
c, and yr denote firm, fortnight, country, and year, respectively. See the Appendix for 




classification effects, we include sector dummies in all models, which are generated using 
information sourced from Datastream. 
 In Table 4, we present our regression results with scaled ADR short interest as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient for illegal is negative and significant in all 
specifications. 1234 Thus, if it is illegal to short sell a stock in its home country, short selling 
also is reduced for that country’s ADRs in the United States., which is evidence in favor 
of the regulatory reach hypothesis. 
Enforcement index is included as a control variable because stricter enforcement 
with less corruption incentivizes traders to follow and implement short-selling rules more 
rigorously. We also use an interaction term between enforcement and short-selling 
restrictions because enforcement by itself is not very important if there are no restrictions 
in the home market. We expect the interaction term to be negative, but it is statistically 
insignificant.  
The coefficients for the return variables are not significant in any of the three 
models. The negative and significant coefficient of orthogonalized market capitalization 
indicates that scaled short interest is lower for bigger firms, but we note that our raw data 
suggest that the unscaled short interest is higher for larger firms. The positive and 
significant coefficient for scaled volume indicates that scaled short interest is higher for 
firms with higher trading volume. The negative and significant coefficient for dividend 
yield indicates that short sellers do not maintain high open interest in high dividend 
paying firms. 







4 The coefficient of illegal also is statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better if we 
use ordinary least squares standard errors, White’s heteroskedasticity consistent errors, or errors 





Regulatory reach of home country short selling restrictions on ADR short interest 
For this table our sample comprises 1,035 ADRs present in the triangular intersection 
of the shortsqueeze.com dataset, Datastream, and the initial ADR list for the period 
November 2007 to October 2009. All of our variables are defined in the Appendix. Our 
dependent variable, Scaled ADR short interest, is the total short interest for firm i for 
fortnight ft, where number of shares outstanding for firm i is used for scaling. Our main 
independent variables are the dummy variables illegal and uptick restriction. The 
remaining independent variables are: option markets, enforcement index, restriction 
*enforcement index, fortnightly return, monthly return, half yearly return, orthogonalized 
market capitalization, scaled volume, dividend yield, level of ADR, return volatility, days 
to cover(t-1), and sector fixed effects. Subscripts i, ft, c, and yr denote firm, fortnight, 
country, and year, respectively. All coefficients are standardized using the SAS proc reg 
stb option. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Statistical 
significance is based on double clustered standard errors along the firm and fortnightly 
time dimensions following Petersen (2009). 
                                                           Dependent variable:  Scaled ADR short interest i,ft 
Variable Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
Intercept 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Illegalc,ft -0.0158**  -0.0141** 
 (-2.41)  (-2.05) 
Uptick restrictionc,ft  -0.0198 -0.0172 
  (-1.42) (-1.20) 
Option marketsc,yr 0.0352* 0.0288 0.0281 
 (1.66) (1.44) (1.41) 
Enforcement indexc 0.0029 0.0036 0.0018 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.07) 
Restrictionc,ft * Enforcement indexc -0.0013 0.0087 0.0083 
 (-0.05) (0.37) (0.36) 
Fortnightly returni,ft-1 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.02) 
Monthly returni,ft 0.0079 0.0074 0.0076 
 (0.70) (0.66) (0.67) 
Half yearly returni,ft -0.0218 -0.0209 -0.0220 
 (-1.39) (-1.33) (-1.40) 
Orthogonalized market capitalizationi -0.0338*** -0.0348*** -0.0343*** 
 (-3.28) (-3.38) (-3.33) 
Scaled volumei,ft 0.5535*** 0.5535*** 0.5534*** 
 (9.09) (9.10) (9.10) 
Dividend Yieldi,ft -0.0402*** -0.0418*** -0.0411*** 
 (-2.96) (-3.04) (-2.99) 
Level of ADR (1-3)i 0.1047*** 0.1048*** 0.1050*** 
 (3.98) (3.99) (4.00) 
Return volatilityi,ft -0.0246** -0.0274** -0.0257** 





Table 4–continued    
                                                           Dependent variable:  Scaled ADR short interest i,ft 
Variable Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
Days to coveri,ft-1 0.1556* 0.1554* 0.1555* 
 (1.81) (1.81) (1.81) 
Sector fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R Square 0.3755 0.3754 0.3756 
Number of Observations 24,235 24,235 24,235 
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.10 level    
There are three levels of ADRs and level III ADRs have the most stringent 
requirement for trading in the United States.5 We include the level of ADR as a control 
variable to see if short sellers are trading level III ADRs more than level I or II ADRs. 
We find the coefficient to be positive and significant, indicating more short selling for 
higher level ADRs. The negative and significant coefficient of return volatility indicates 
that short sellers do not want to maintain high open interest for volatile stocks. The 
positive and significant coefficient of days to cover indicates that traders are not deterred 
by the length of time that it might take to cover the aggregate short positions outstanding 
in the ADRs. Instead, our findings demonstrate that traders apply momentum strategies 
and short previously shorted stocks even more.  
                                                 
5 The J.P. Morgan dataset indicates whether the ADR is level I, II, or III. To qualify for 
having a sponsored level I ADR, a company’s shares must be traded on at least one non-U.S. 
exchange and the firm must post an annual report in English on its web site, but the company is 
not required to meet U.S. accounting standards. To qualify for a level II sponsored ADR, a firm 
must register with the SEC and comply with U.S. accounting standards. Firms meeting level II 
standards can have their ADRs traded on a U.S. stock exchange. Firms wishing to raise capital in 
the United States from investors can do so through a level III ADR program by meeting standards 
similar to those for U.S. companies. In addition to ADRs that are freely traded, there are two 
types of restricted ADRs: a) SEC Rule 144(a) ADRs are private placements that do not trade on 
an established exchange and can be purchased only by a Qualified Institutional Buyer and b) 
Regulation S ADRs also can be used to raise capital but are not registered in the United States 




We continue to test the regulatory reach hypothesis using high frequency short 
volume data from FINRA and the BATS exchange. We aggregate the transaction 
quantity for each stock for each day to form stock-day observations for short selling 
volume. We estimate regressions based on all or a subset of the following equation: 
scaled ADR short volumei,d = α0 + α1 illegalc,d + α2 uptick restrictionc,d  
+ α3 option marketsc,yr + α4 enforcement indexc  
+ α5 restrictionsc,d * enforcement indexc  + α6 returni,d + α7 weekly returni,d-1  
+ α8 monthly returni,d-1 + α9 half-yearly returni,d-1  
+ α10 orthogonalized market capitalizationi + α11 dividend yieldi,d  
+ α12 level of ADRi + α13 return volatilityi,d  
+ α14-17 industrial sector fixed effectsi + εi,d                                                           (3) 
where α0–α17 are parameters to be estimated and ε is a random error term.  
We report the estimation results for equation 3 in Table 5 and find that these data 
largely serve to confirm the evidence presented in the previous table. For brevity, we 
focus the discussion on model 3c, where all variables are included. 
The coefficient for illegal is negative and significant, indicating that higher levels 
of home country restrictions are associated with a lower level of short volume in the 
ADR market.  The coefficient for uptick restriction, though negative in sign, is not 
statistically significant again, implying that its impact is not as strong as a ban on short 
selling. The coefficient of option markets is insignificant. The coefficient on enforcement 
index itself is positive and statistically significant, but the key testable implication of 





Regulatory reach of home country short selling restrictions on ADR short volume 
For this table our sample comprises 559 ADRs present in the FINRA and BATS 
datasets for the period August 2009 to January 2010. All of our variables are defined in 
the Appendix. Our dependent variable, scaled ADR short volume, is daily short volume 
for each firm i for each day d, where we use firm i‘s total trading volume for scaling. Our 
main independent variables are the dummy variables illegal and uptick restriction. The 
remaining independent variables, defined formally in the Appendix, are: option markets, 
enforcement index, restriction* enforcement index, return, weekly return, monthly return, 
half yearly return, orthogonalized market capitalization, dividend yield, level of ADR, 
return volatility, and sector fixed effects. Subscripts i, d, c, and yr denote firm, day, 
country, and year, respectively. All coefficients are standardized using the SAS proc reg 
stb option. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Statistical 
significance is based on double clustered standard errors along the firm and fortnightly 
time dimensions following Petersen (2009). 
 
                                                        Dependent variable:  Scaled ADR short volume i,d 
Variable Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c 
Intercept 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Illegalc,d -0.0292*  -0.0272** 
 (-1.74)  (-2.02) 
Uptick restrictionc,d  -0.0264 -0.0216 
  (-0.45) (-0.37) 
Option marketsc,yr -0.0686** -0.0738 -0.0769 
 (-2.30) (-1.56) (-1.60) 
Enforcement indexc 0.1469** 0.1477** 0.1460** 
 (2.34) (2.33) (2.31) 
Restrictionc,d * Enforcement indexc 0.0690 0.0831 0.0809 
 (1.42) (1.56) (1.54) 
Returni,d 0.0220** 0.0222** 0.0221** 
 (2.12) (2.13) (2.11) 
Weekly returni,d-1 0.0382* 0.0388* 0.0385* 
 (1.84) (1.88) (1.86) 
Monthly returni,d-1 -0.0543 -0.0542 -0.0542 
 (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.87) 
Half yearly returni,d-1 0.0196 0.0171 0.0184 
 (0.32) (0.27) (0.29) 
Orthogonalized market capitalizationi -0.0436 -0.0445 -0.0438 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dividend Yieldi,d -0.0146 -0.0130 -0.0143 
 (-0.72) (-0.65) (-0.71) 
Level of ADR (1-3)i 0.0101 0.0152 0.0125 
 (0.23) (0.36) (0.30) 
Return volatilityi,d 0.0955*** 0.0967*** 0.0958*** 
 (2.89) (2.91) (2.89) 




Table 5–continued    
                                                     Dependent variable:  Scaled ADR short volume i,d 
Variable Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c 
Adjusted R Square 0.042 0.0416 0.0422 
Number of Observations 27,209 27,206 27,206 
**Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.10 level  
The positive and significant coefficients for shorter term return variables are 
consistent with prior studies that characterize short sellers as contrarian traders who short 
stock when it experiences a significant price appreciation (Diether, Lee, and Werner, 
2009; Jain, Jain, and McInish, 2012). The effect of the monthly and half-yearly returns on 
short volume is found to be insignificant. Coefficients for firm size, dividend yield, and 
ADR level are insignificant. Stock volatility has a positive coefficient in the volume 
regression, whereas it had a negative coefficient in the short interest regression. Thus, 
volatility induces short sellers to become active, but they are quick to cover their 
positions for such stocks, driving down the short open interest.  
Our conclusions about the impact of home country regulations on ADRs using 
both fortnightly short interest data and high frequency FINRA short volume data are 
qualitatively similar, which is not surprising given the statistically significant positive 
correlation of 0.76 between these two alternative dependent variables. To estimate this 
measure, we sum the FINRA short volume to calculate fortnightly short volume, and, 
then we calculate the correlation between the two fortnightly variables. Overall, our 
results support the regulatory reach hypothesis. 
4.5. Reverse regulatory reach 
So far, we have analyzed the reach of home market restrictions on short selling of 




selling of financial stocks on Sept. 19, 2008. In this section, we test if there is regulatory 
reach in the reverse direction, i.e., we investigate the effects of short selling restrictions in 
the United States on stock borrowing for U.S. financial firms outside U.S. markets.  
In Table 6, we present the results of an event study around the U.S. short ban 
period where we analyze the stock borrowing for U.S. stocks in domestic and foreign 
locations. We compute the changes in these variables from the period one month before 
to the period one month after Sept. 19, 2008. We find that the ban reduced scaled stock 
borrowing for the affected firms by 20% within the United States. There is no evidence of 
any regulatory arbitrage where traders moved their activity to foreign jurisdictions. 
Instead the evidence points to reverse regulatory reach of U.S. regulations in foreign 
locations; stock borrowing for U.S. firms reduced by 70% in foreign locations. Reverse 
regulatory reach applies to U.S. banks as well as to non-banking financial firms.  
Additional insights into the issue of reverse regulatory reach for U.S. financial 
stocks borrowed in foreign locations may be obtained by estimating the following 
multivariate regression: 
scaled shares borrowed in foreign locationsi,d = α0 + α1 illegald  
+ α2 option marketsi + α3 returni,d + α4 weekly returni,d-1 + α5 monthly returni,d-1  
+ α6 half-yearly returni,d-1 + α7 scaled volumei,d + α8 dividend yieldi,d 
 + α9 return volatilityi,d + α10 stock borrowing costi,d + εi,d                        (4) 
where α0–α10 are parameters to be estimated and ε is a random error term. 




Impact of SEC’s temporary short selling ban on stock borrowing within the United States and outside the United States 
We analyze the period one month before and one month after Sept. 19, 2008, when the SEC imposed a temporary short 
selling ban for 799 financial firms. Of these, 539 firms have stock borrowing information in Data Explorers. We analyze scaled 
borrowing, which is outstanding stock borrowing for each firm i on day d, scaled using each firm’s market capitalization. 
Scaled borrowing for the firms in the United States before the ban period (during the ban period) is reported in column 1 (2). 
Scaled borrowing for the firms outside the United States before the ban period (during the ban period) is reported in column 5 
(6). In column 3 (7), we present column 2 minus 1 (6 minus 5). In column 4 (8), we present the values in column 3 (7) 
converted to percentages. 
  Scaled borrowing = $ Shares borrowed / Market Capitalization 
  In U.S. - Domestic stocks or ADRs 
Domestic stocks outside U.S./Underlying in 
Home country 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
  Before 
Ban 




Ban Col 3-2 Percentage 
Difference 
Overall 3.248% 2.590% -0.657%*** -20% 0.051% 0.015% -0.036%* -70% 
t-stat   (13.77)    (1.68)  
          
Commercial Banks 3.890% 3.210% -0.680% -17% 0.122% 0.027% -0.095% -78% 
Saving Institutions 
and other Banks 
1.855% 1.446% -0.410% -22% 0.000% 0.001% 0.001% 0% 
Banks 2.956% 2.400% -0.556% -19% 0.085% 0.019% -0.066% -78% 
          
Insurance Carriers 2.984% 2.227% -0.757% -25% 0.052% 0.016% -0.036% -69% 
Other Non Banks 4.828% 3.773% -1.055% -22% 0.013% 0.011% -0.002% -17% 
Non - Banks 4.011% 3.088% -0.923% -23% 0.030% 0.013% -0.017% -57% 
  
ADRs 0.065% 0.040% -0.025% -38% 2.004% 1.282% -0.723% -36% 
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level
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In this regression, the illegal dummy has a value of 1 during the period of the 
temporary ban on short selling in the United States from Sept. 19, 2008 to Oct. 8, 2008, 
and 0 otherwise. The option market dummy has a value of 1 if the stock is optionable and 
0 otherwise.  All variable definitions and data sources are shown in the Appendix. The 
results are presented in Table 7 and reveal that the coefficient for illegal is negative and 
significant. This suggest that where short selling is temporarily banned in the United 
States for a given firm, stock borrowing for that firm also is reduced in foreign locations. 
Thus, these results indicate that U.S. regulations also have regulatory reach, which we 
call reverse regulatory reach to aid clarity. The coefficient of option markets is positive 
and significant, implying a complementary relationship between shorting and derivatives. 
The coefficients for the return variables are not statistically significant as are the 
coefficients for scaled volume, return volatility and stock borrowing cost variables. The 
negative and significant coefficient for dividend yield indicates that stock borrowing is 
lower for dividend payers. 
Overall, our results reject the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis and support the 
regulatory reach hypothesis, including reverse regulatory reach. To provide further 
insights into these relationships, we now proceed to consider the mechanisms of  
regulatory reach.  
4.6. Mechanisms of regulatory reach 
We have grouped the possible mechanisms of regulatory reach into two main 
categories–inter-government cooperation and investor conduct. On the one hand, 






Reverse regulatory reach of U.S. short selling restriction outside the United States  
For this table our sample comprises 168 domestic U.S. firms that have borrowings 
outside the United States during July 2006 to January 2010. All of our variables are 
defined in the Appendix. The dependent variable, scaled shares borrowed in foreign 
locations, is outstanding stock borrowing for each firm i for each day d, from Data 
Explorer, scaled by each firm’s market capitalization in the home market. Our main 
independent variable is the dummy variable illegal. The remaining independent variables 
are: option, return, weekly return, monthly return, half yearly return, scaled volume, 
dividend yield, return volatility, and borrowing cost. Subscripts i, d, c, and yr denote firm, 
day, country, and year, respectively. All coefficients are standardized using the SAS proc 
reg stb option. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Statistical significance is based on double clustered standard errors along the firm and 
fortnightly time dimensions following Petersen (2009). 
 








Weekly returni,d-1 -0.0007 
 (-0.08) 
Monthly returni,d-1 0.0068 
 (0.47) 
Half yearly returni,d-1 0.0056 
 (0.12) 
Scaled volumei,d 0.0257 
 (1.04) 
Dividend Yieldi,d -0.1178* 
 (-1.65) 
Return volatilityi,d -0.0024 
 (-1.59) 
Borrowing costi,d 0.0004 
 (0.03) 
  Adjusted R Square 0.0466 
Number of Observations 13,229 






between countries, facilitate the implementation of regulatory intent through cross border 
recognition of laws by enforcement agencies and courts. On the other hand, investors’ 
own behavior is influenced by an adherence to ethical practices such as those mentioned 
in the CFA standards of ethical and professional conduct, or conservative business 
practices driven by a desire to build an honest reputation. In the analysis that follows, we 
discriminate between these two different reasons. We proxy the mechanism of inter-
government cooperation by using information on the originating country’s membership in 
G7, EU, or OECD groups and more formal bilateral investment treaties (BTTs) between 
countries. For the investor conduct mechanism, we have two proxies, concentration of 
CFA charter holders in the finance industry and the institutional infrastructure for stock 
borrowing. Neither of these two variables emanates directly from the short selling 
statutes, but both relate to the inherent desire of traders to do things in the right manner. 
We expect that CFA charter holders follow the professional conduct of knowing laws in 
different jurisdictions and adhering to the stricter law regarding short selling restrictions. 
Likewise, if institutions follow the spirit of the restrictions on short trades, they reduce 
their stock lending operations even though the law may not prohibit lending itself.  
This analysis is based only on the observations where short selling is illegal in the 
home country (illegal =1) because we are interested in assessing the reach of regulatory 
restrictions, not the reach of regulatory freedom. Consequently, the illegal variable is not 
included in the regression model. The dependent variable is the scaled ADR short interest 
and the independent variables capture information on the possible mechanisms of 





scaled ADR short interesti,ft = α0 + α1 G7c + α2 EUc + α3 OECDc  
+ α4 Group (G7/EU/OECD)c + α5 Bi-lateral investment treaty with U.S.c  
+ α6 CFA/Populationc + α7 option marketsc,yr + α8 enforcement indexc  
+ α9 fortnightly returni,ft-1 +  α10 monthly returni,ft + α11 half-yearly returni,ft  
+ α12 orthogonalized market capitalizationi + α13 scaled volumei,ft  
+ α14 dividend yieldi,ft  + α15 level of ADRi + α16 return volatilityi,ft  
+ α17 days to coveri,ft  + α18-21 industrial sector fixed effectsi + εi,ft                       (5) 
where α0–α21 are parameters to be estimated and ε is a random error term. Subscripts i, ft, 
c, and yr denote firm, fortnight, country, and year, respectively. See the Appendix for 
variable definitions and data sources. We present our analysis of these mechanisms in 
Table 8, which presents the regression results. The first six models are regression 
equations that individually test our different measures of the mechanisms of regulatory 
reach.  We find that the coefficients for the measures of inter-government cooperation are 
all negative and generally significant (only the coefficient for the bilateral investment 
treaty with the United States is insignificant in these stand-alone regressions).  Further the 
CFA/Population investor conduct variable is statistically significant and negative (-
0.2074 in model 6).  Taken together, these results suggest that both inter-government 
cooperation and investor conduct are effective mechanisms of regulatory reach. The final 
model (7) presented in Table 8 includes the group (G7/EU/OECD), bilateral investment 
treaty, and the CFA/Population variables. The coefficient for bilateral investment treaty is 




no longer significant.123456 Finally, the CFA/Population investor conduct has a statistically 
significant negative coefficient in both combined regression and stand-alone regression.  
The proportion of CFA charter holders is a good proxy for investor conduct not 
only because of their strong emphasis on high standards of ethics and professional 
conduct, but also because obtaining a CFA charter is a personal educational decision 
largely independent of the inter-government cooperation among countries. Nonetheless, 
we also orthogonalize this investor conduct proxy to make it statistically independent of 
the inter-government cooperation in a two-step regression. For the sake of brevity, we 
choose not to report these results, however, we do note that the coefficient for the 
orthogonalized CFA variable is significantly negative, indicating that investor conduct is 
a driving force behind the regulatory reach of foreign laws. Legal restrictions in the home 
market limit the shares institutions make available for borrowing, aiding regulatory reach. 
We test and confirm this in the data where a regression of scaled shares available to 
borrow on the illegal variable produces a negative coefficient for illegal variable.7 Thus, 
when a country bans short selling, fewer shares of that country’s stocks are available 
worldwide for short sellers to borrow, which again results in short sellers being less 
aggressive.










6 We also use executive membership of International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) as an additional proxy for inter-government cooperation. We find the 
coefficient of the IOSCO dummy variable to be insignificant both with and without any control 
variables. 
7 The results are not tabulated for brevity but are summarized in the following equation. 
Scaled shares available to borrow worldwidei,d = 0.0000 (Intercept)  - 0.0811 Illegalc,d  + 0.6790 
Uptick restrictionc,d  + 0.0259 Option marketsc,yr - 0.0012 Returni,d + 0.0156 Weekly returni,d - 
Monthly returni,d  + 0.0194 Half yearly returni,d + 0.0858 Scaled volumei,d  - 0.0476 Dividend 
Yieldi,d  - 0.0339 Return volatilityi,d -0.0422 Borrowing costi,d  - 0.0035 Days to coveri,d-1+ Sector 
fixed effects +  εi,d where bold indicates significance at the 0.10 level or better using double 
cluster standard errors. Shares available to borrow worldwide is the value of current inventory 




Mechanism of regulatory reach of home country short selling restrictions on ADR short interest 
For this table our sample comprises 196 ADRs for which illegal equals one, which is a subset of the 1,035 ADRs present in 
the triangular intersection of the shortsqueeze.com dataset, Datastream, and the initial ADR list from November 2007 to 
October 2009. Our dependent variable, scaled ADR short interest, is total short interest for firm i for fortnight ft, scaled by 
each firm’s shares outstanding. Our main independent variables are G7, EU, OECD, Group (G7/EU/OECD), Bilateral 
investment treaty with United States, and CFA/ Population. The remaining independent variables are: option markets, 
enforcement index, fortnightly, monthly, and half yearly returns, orthogonalized market capitalization, scaled volume, 
dividend yield, level of ADR, return volatility, days to cover(t-1),and sector fixed effects. Subscripts i, ft, c, and yr denote firm, 
fortnight, country, and year, respectively. All coefficients are standardized using the SAS proc reg stb option. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Statistical significance is based on double clustered standard errors 
along the firm and fortnightly time dimensions following Petersen (2009). 
 
                                            Dependent variable: Scaled ADR short interest i,ft 
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Intercept 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
G7c -0.0518**       
 (-2.41)       
EUc  -0.0865**      
  (-2.58)      
OECDc   -0.1352*     
   (-1.81)     
Group (G7/EU/OECD)c    -0.1372*   -0.1226 
    (-1.83)   (-1.37) 
Bilateral investment treaty with U.S.c    -0.0672  -0.1068** 
     (-1.38)  (-1.97) 
CFA/Populationc      -0.2074*** -0.0807* 
      (-2.80) (-1.93) 
Option marketsc,yr       0.1334 
       (1.16) 
Enforcement indexc       -0.0451 
       (-0.47) 




Table 8–continued        
                                            Dependent variable: Scaled ADR short interest i,ft 
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Fortnightly Returni,ft-1       0.0070 
       (0.52) 
Monthly returni,ft       -0.0028 
       (-0.15) 
Half yearly returni,ft       -0.0015 
       (-0.07) 
Orthogonalized market capitalizationi      -0.0096 
       (-0.22) 
Scaled volumei,ft       0.7712*** 
       (4.05) 
Dividend Yieldi,ft       0.0033 
       (0.14) 
Level of ADR (1-3)i       0.0054 
       (0.10) 
Return volatilityi,ft       -0.0356* 
       (-1.71) 
Days to coveri,ft-1       0.0936*** 
       (2.66) 
Sector fixed effects 
 
      Yes 
Adjusted R Square 0.0023 0.0071 0.0179 0.0184 0.0041 0.0426 0.6844 
Number of Observations 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 1,197 
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.10 level 
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4.7. Robustness tests 
We find that the negative coefficient on illegal in the regulatory reach regression 
of scaled ADR short interest is robust to alternative model specifications and sub-
samples. For the sake of brevity, we do not formally tabulate these results, but instead 
choose to summarize our findings in this section. In this discussion of robustness tests, 
the benchmark value for the coefficient of illegal is -0.0158 from model 2a of Table 4.  
First, we estimate the regression with unscaled dollar short borrowing without 
adjusting for the number of shares outstanding. The coefficient of illegal is -0.0370, 
which suggests a slightly stronger regulatory reach on dollar borrowing than on 
borrowing ratio. Second, we estimate the scaled borrowing regression using a smaller 
sample of only level III ADRs, which are subject to the most stringent U.S. securities 
regulations and trade alongside other U.S. stocks on the main stock exchanges. The 
coefficient of illegal is -0.0073, implying that even level III ADRs are affected by home 
country short selling regulations. Third, we control for institutional ownership, which has 
a positive relation with short selling, consistent with prior research. Due to limited data 
availability, when we add institutional ownership as the only control variable in the 
regression, the sample size still drops dramatically from 24,235 in Table 4 to 9,758.  This 
does not change the tenor of our results however, as the coefficient of illegal remains 
negative (-0.0427) and statistically significant. The coefficient for institutional ownership 
itself is 0.2352 and statistically significant; the positive coefficient is consistent with 
D’Avolio (2002) and Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) who argue that higher 
institutional ownership positively affects short selling by increasing the supply of 




cover (DTC). In our main analysis presented in Table 4, we use DTC in the ADR market. 
DTCh for the home market cannot be computed directly from home country borrowing 
data. Furthermore, DTCh cannot be computed if a country banned short selling related 
stock borrowing in the home markets. Keeping in mind those limitations, we compute a 
surrogate home market DTCh defined as stock borrowed divided by daily home country 
trading volume. With short interest as the dependent variable, the coefficient on home 
country DTCh is insignificant in double clustered regressions. However, the coefficient of 
illegal remains statistically significant with a negative value of -0.0181. The coefficient 
for illegal remains statistically significant and negative also if we drop DTC from the 
regressions.  
Next, we test the regulatory reach hypothesis for the three sub-periods before, 
during, and after the 2008 financial crisis. We estimate these four models with unscaled 
short interest as the dependent variables. The estimated coefficients for the illegal 
variable are negative and statistically significant in all three regressions ranging from -
0.0677 to -0.0272, compared with the overall period coefficient of -0.0370.  Similarly, 
home country short selling restrictions have a negative impact on scaled short interest, 
both including and excluding the crisis period. The results indicate that restrictions curtail 
short selling in the ADR markets and that the financial crisis did not materially change 
the phenomenon of regulatory reach. 
Finally, we perform a control sample analysis to ensure that negative coefficient 
on illegal is based on regulatory reach of home country restrictions and not on any 
confounding factors within the United States that would affect all domestic stocks as well 




criteria include industry, exchange listing, price-to-book value (PTBV), and market 
capitalization.12345678 Short selling of U.S. stocks is not expected to be affected by changes in 
the legality of short selling abroad for the matched stocks. We exclude the period when 
short selling is restricted in the United States.  ADR stocks are similar to the matched 
control sample of U.S. stocks except that some ADRs originate from a home country with 
short selling restrictions whereas others originate from unsrestricted countries. Using this 
control sample, we estimate a regression with scaled short interest as the dependent 
variable.9 The illegal variable in this model is interacted with the indicator variables for 
ADRs (treatment stocks) or domestic stocks (matched control sample). We find that the 
home country regulations reach out in lowering the ADR short interest (with a negative 
coefficient of -0.0516 that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level); however, those 
regulations appear to have no impact on short interest of matched non-ADR domestic 
U.S. stocks (the coefficient 0.0250 is not significant even at the 0.10 level). 
Thus, the additional analysis discussed in this sub-section indicates that our 
results on regulatory reach are robust for different specifications and sub-samples.  
 















8 For the Price to Book Value for ADRs (Non-ADR domestic U.S. firms) the means are 
3.13 (3.13) and the standard deviations are 6.81 (5.91). For the Ln Market value for ADRs (Non-
ADR domestic U.S. firms) the means are 7.80 (7.35) and the standard deviations are 1.99 (1.79).  
 
9 The results are not tabulated for brevity but the regressions estimates can be 
summarized as follows: Scaled short interesti,ft = 0.0000
 Intercept - 0.0347 Illegalc,ft*ADR + 
0.0190 Illegalc,ft*Non ADR domestic U.S. stocks - 0.0153 Uptick restrictionsc,ft - 0.0558 Option 
marketsc,yr + 0.0577 Enforcement indexc + 0.0188 Restrictionc,d * Enforcement indexc + 0.0002 
Fortnightly returni,ft−1 - 0.0052 Monthly returni,ft - 0.0236 Half yearly returni,ft + 0.0043 
Orthogonalized market capitalizationi,ft + 0.3808
 Scaled volumei,ft - 0.0307 Dividend yieldi,ft 
- 0.0298 Return volatilityi,ft + 0.2931 Days to coverft−1 + Industry fixed effects + εi,ft where bold 





Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive characterization of the 
worldwide market for short selling and stock borrowing using several datasets that 
capture short selling regulations, actual short selling, and outstanding short interest in 
stocks from 82 countries. The theme of our paper is the examination of global regulatory 
reach of short selling restrictions in a multimarket environment.  
The first issue that we address is whether restrictions on short selling in a given 
country are effective in reducing short-selling-related borrowing. Our results suggest that 
short selling regulations reduce borrowing in the home country by 45%, on average.  
Next, we examine whether home country restrictions on short selling reduce short 
selling of ADRs in the United States, which we call the “regulatory reach” hypothesis. 
Alternatively, the competing hypothesis of regulatory arbitrage takes the view that if 
short selling is illegal in a home country, there is greater short selling in the United States 
of the ADRs from that country due to short sellers’ efforts to circumvent the home 
country regulations. Using data from shortsqueeze.com, FINRA, BATS, and Data 
Explorers, we find support for the regulatory reach hypothesis in cross-sectional, event 
study, and panel-data tests. Due to the regulatory reach of home country short selling 
restrictions, stock borrowing for the affected ADRs drops by 68%, on average, in the 
United States. Similarly, in a multivariate regression of scaled short interest, the 
statistically significant negative coefficient again supports our regulatory reach 
hypothesis. Our results are robust to differences in firm specific characteristics, such as 




volatility, days to cover, level of ADR, and industrial sectors. We also document a 
reverse regulatory reach for the SEC’s temporary short selling ban on shorting 799 
financial stocks in 2008, which reduced stock borrowing for these firms both within and 
outside the United States. 
Various mechanisms can cause home market regulations to have a strong global 
regulatory reach and we consider two possible mechanisms–inter-government 
cooperation and investor conduct. Inter-government cooperation can work through 
working groups such as G7, OECD or EU or bilateral investment treaties. Investor 
conduct is influenced by professional standards of bodies such as CFA institute or 
institutional unwillingness to conduct stock lending when short selling is illegal. Our 
results indicate that investor and institutional conduct strengthens regulatory reach more 
than membership in working groups or treaties.  
Our paper contributes to the short selling and cross listing research with two main 
findings. First, restrictions on short selling in a given country are effective in reducing 
short-selling-related borrowing in that country. Second, from the investors’ point of view, 
cross listing in the United States is not a vehicle for circumventing regulatory control on 
short selling in the home country. Regulatory controls in the home country also stifle 
short selling of ADRs. An important implication of our regulatory reach findings is that 
the regulators appear to have a great ability to obtain desired investor protection 
outcomes with little sacrifice on business competitiveness front even in a fiercely 
competitive global economy. Additional cooperation and coordination among the global 





Variables definitions and data sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Measures of short selling (dependent variables)   
Shares borrowed 
 
 Total value of borrowed/loaned securities net of 
double counting, reported at daily frequency 
 Data Explorers 
Total short interest  Total number of outstanding shorted shares for 
each ADR reported at fortnightly frequency 
 Shortsqueeze.com 
Short volume  Aggregate number of shares sold short each day 
(computed from transaction level data) 
 Reg SHO data from FINRA and 
BATS exchange 
Regulatory measures     
Illegal  Indicator variable that has value of 1 when short 
selling is banned in the home country and 0 when 
short selling is allowed 
 Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu 
(2007), Charoenrook and 
Daouk (2008), Clifford Chance 
LLP. (2009), and for time series 
Beber and Pagano (2012) and 
direct correspondence with 
stock exchanges and regulators 
Uptick restriction  Indicator variable that has value of 1 when short 
selling is restricted by price tests in the home 
country and 0 otherwise 
 Clifford Chance LLP. (2009) 
and stock exchanges websites  
Restriction  Indicator variable that has value of 1 when short 
selling is restricted by any means such as total 
ban, ban on naked short selling, or price tests in 
the home country and 0 otherwise 
 Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu 
(2007), Charoenrook and 
Daouk (2008), Clifford Chance 
LLP. (2009), and for time series 
Beber and Pagano (2012) and 
direct correspondence with 
stock exchanges and regulators  
   




Appendix –continued   
Variable  Definition  Source 
Country and market design variables   
Option markets  Number of years for which the option markets 
have existed in a particular country 
 Charoenrook and Daouk (2008) 
Option  Indicator variable that has value of 1 when the 
options for particular stocks are traded on CBOE, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 CBOE option trading list 
Enforcement index (CPI)  Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks each 
country by its perceived level of corruption 
relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks 
in public procurement, embezzlement of public 
funds, and effectiveness of public sector anti-
corruption efforts. Higher numbers indicate 
stronger enforcement and lower numbers indicate 
corruption and lawlessness. 




G7  Indicator variable that has value of 1 for G7 
countries. 
  
EU  Indicator variable that has value of 1 for 
European Union countries. 
  
OECD  Indicator variable that has value of 1 for OECD 
countries. 
  
Group (G7/EU/OECD)  Indicator variable that has value of 1 when the 
country is part of G7, EU, or OECD group. 
  
Bilateral investment treaty 
with U.S. 
 Indicator variable that has value of 1 when the 
country has signed a bilateral investment treaty 
with the United States 
 United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 




Appendix –continued     
Variable  Definition  Source 
CFA/Population  Number of charterholders in the country divided 
by the population of that country 
 CFA institute member resources 
and www.worldatlas.com 
Firm-specific variables     
    Return variables     
       Return (Daily or 
fortnightly) 
 Log (Return indext)-log (Return indext-1). For 
daily returns we substitute d for t. For fortnightly 
returns we substitute ft for t. The Return index is 
adjusted for dividends. These are essentially a 
firm’s stock returns. 
 Datastream International 
       Weekly return  Log (Return indexd-1)-log (Return indexd-6).   Datastream International 
       Monthly return  Log (Return indexd-1)-log (Return indexd-21).   Datastream International 
       Half yearly return  Log (Return indexd-1)-log (Return indexd-121).   Datastream International 
Orthogonalized market 
capitalization 
 Market capitalization is a firm’s share price 
multiplied by the number of ordinary shares 
outstanding in millions of USD at the beginning 
of our sample period. For table 4, we 
orthogonalized market capitalization by 
regressing it on shares outstanding and trading 
volume. For table 5, we orthogonalized market 
capitalization by regressing it on trading volume. 
 Datastream International 
Scaled volume  For daily level borrowing data regressions, it is 
dollar value of trading volume on day t divided 
by market capitalization.  For fortnightly short 
interest regressions, it is trading volume in terms 
of number of shares on the last day of fortnight 
divided by shares outstanding.  




Appendix –continued     
Variable  Definition  Source 
Dividend yield  Dividend per share as a percentage of the firm’s 
share price 
 Datastream International 
Level of ADR  Ordinal variable that equals 1(OTC), 2 (exchange 
listed), or 3 (public offering to raise capital) 
 Bank of New York Mellon 
(www.adrbnymellon.com) and 
JP Morgan (www.adr.com) 
Return volatility  For daily regressions, it is intraday high price 
minus intraday low price divided by intraday high 
price. For fortnightly regressions it is fortnightly 
high price minus fortnightly low price divided by 
fortnightly high price.  
 Datastream International 
Borrowing costs  Stock borrowing cost is value weighted average 
stock lending fee for all open loans expressed in 
undisclosed fee buckets 0-5 (0 indicates the 
cheapest to borrow). Stock borrower indirectly 
pays the lending fee to the stock lender. Basically 
the lending fee is an imputed cost; it is the 
amount of rebate in the interest paid by the 
security lender to the security borrower on cash 
collateral which borrower provides to the lender.  
 Data Explorers 
Lagged days to cover 
(DTC) 
 Current short interest divided by average daily 
trading volume (ratio computed for previous day) 
 Shortsqueeze.com 
Sector fixed effects  Dummy variables for Utility, Transportation, 
Financial, and Insurance sectors. Base case is the 
“Industrials” sector. 
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